













Université de Strasbourg 
Pôle Européen de Gestion et d’Economie  
61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 





de Recherche  

















   
Trading activity and Overconfidence:  
First Evidence from a large European Database 
 
 











Trading activity and Overconfidence:  
First Evidence from a large European Database 
Boolell-Gunesh. S
1  – Merli M
2




We investigate the presence of overconfidence for 43 958 individual investors using a large brokerage account 
database between 1999 and 2006.  We employ three methodologies to gauge overconfidence and our main 
results show that  independently of the methodology considered, individual investors are subject to 
overconfidence and consequently trade  too frequently. Securities investors are buying are systematically 
underperforming those they are selling on follow-up periods; investors are clearly not making profitable trades. 
JEL Classification : G 10 
 
Résumé 
Nous étudions la présence de  surconfiance  pour  43 958   investisseurs individuels à partir d’une base de 
données de transactions individuelles sur la période 1999-2006. Trois méthodes visant à évaluer la rentabilité 
des stratégies d’investissement retenues par les investisseurs sont mises en œuvre et nos résultats montrent 
que quelle que soit la méthodologie considérée, les investisseurs individuels sont surconfiants et échangent 
trop fréquemment. Les stratégies adoptées par ceux-ci sont en moyenne sous-optimales, les titres achetés 
sous-performant systématiquement les titres vendus sur différents horizons d’investissement. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Trading volume appears high on financial markets. For example, latest figures 
published by NYSE-Euronext in 2009 acknowledge that on average, 1.5 million securities 
have been traded each day in Europe. While this volume seems disproportionate to investors’ 
rebalancing and hedging needs, proponents of behavioral finance suggest that one possible 
explanation to this phenomenon is overconfidence (see De Bondt and Thaler ,1995).  
Overconfidence is a concept borrowed from psychology. In a broad manner, 
overconfidence can manifest itself in the following forms: miscalibration of probabilities, 
better than average effect, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism.  
Miscalibration is the difference between the accuracy rate and probability assigned 
that an answer is correct. Overconfidence is a particular form of miscalibration in which the 
assigned probability that the answer is correct exceeds the true accuracy of answers. 
Overconfidence in terms of miscalibration is generally measured by asking people to 
construct confidence intervals for several uncertain quantities. The usual finding is that 
people’s probability distributions are too tight and that the assigned probability is greater that 
the proportion of correct answers (Lichtenstein et al.,1982). Concerning stock markets, it has 
been found that when people are asked to define confidence intervals for the return of an 
index or a stock, they usually underestimate volatility (DeBondt, 1998, Hilton, 2001, Glaser et 
al., 2005)   
The better than average effect hints to the fact that people believe that they are above 
average and that individuals have unrealistic positive views of themselves (Taylor and Brown, 3 
 
1988, Cooper et al., 1988). One famous example comes from Svenson (1981). While asking a 
group of US students  to grade their driving skills, the author  highlights that 50% of the 
participants rank themselves among the 30% of drivers with the highest driving safety.  
Illusion of control relates to the observation that people tend to believe they can 
influence events which are in fact governed mainly by chance. An example of this illusion is 
given by Langer (1975), Miller and Ross (1975) or Presson and Benassi (1996) ; they show 
that people are ready to pay a higher price for a lottery ticket they can choose themselves, as if 
this could yield a more favorable result. Moreover, if these individuals expect certain 
outcomes and these outcomes do occur, they are prone to assign them to their doing rather 
than  to  luck and reaffirm they can control events purely random events. Finally, 
overconfidence can lead to a form of unrealistic optimism. People believe that they have 
better chances than others to be confronted to positive events in their future life  and 
particularly for their financial investments (Benartzi, Kahneman and Thaler, 1999). On the 
other hand, they think that others are more likely to face unfavorable events such as burglary 
or accidents. 
Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2001), Barber and Odean (2002) and Glaser and 
Weber (2007) show that overconfidence can lead to excessive trading on financial markets. 
Odean (1999) analyzes trading records of 10 000 individual investors in the US. The author 
considers that overconfidence relates to the miscalibration of the accuracy or precision of 
financial information. He formulates the following hypothesis. Over defined horizons, the 
securities these investors buy should outperform those they sell by at least enough to cover 
transaction costs. On the opposite, an overconfident trader who, for example, overestimates 
the precision of his information, may trade even if transaction costs are not taken care of. The 
author  thus tests for overconfidence by determining whether, over appropriate horizons, 4 
 
securities investors buy outperform securities they sell by at least enough to cover transaction 
costs. The author shows that this is clearly not the case. For example, even before considering 
transaction costs, for the entire sample over a one year horizon, the average return to a 
purchased security is 3.3% lower than the average return to a security sold. Investors are not 
making profitable trades; they should trade less. Barber and Odean (2001) investigate 
overconfidence  by using a “gender approach” ; they  show that men are more overconfident 
than women. This behavior reduces net returns earned by men by 2.65% per year. Barber and 
Odean (2002) obtain similar results by analyzing the trading behavior of individual investors 
who switch to  online trading. These investors earned exceptional returns in the period 
preceding their online debuts, beating the market by an average return of 2.4% on a yearly 
basis. The authors show that after going online, these investors trade more actively and less 
profitably; they underperform the market. Overconfidence can explain these observations: 
when people succeed, they often give themselves too much credit for their success. Failures, 
on the other hand, are blamed to others or to misfortune. It is likely that these investors 
thought that the excellent returns they earned before going online were due to their investment 
skills. Being “aware” of their talent, they increased their trading activity after going online 
and suffered from poor portfolio performance. 
Finally, Glaser and Weber (2007) investigate the link between overconfidence and 
trading volume in an innovative way. The authors ask approximately 3000 online broker 
investors to answer an internet questionnaire designed to measure the following forms of 
overconfidence  :  miscalibration, the better than average effect, illusion of control and 
unrealistic optimism. Simultaneously, they compute several measures of trading volume of 
these individual investors (number of trades, turnover, etc). In a last step, they evaluate the 
correlation between the overconfidence scores they observe and the measures of trading 5 
 
volume.  For instance, Glaser and Weber (2007) gauge “miscalibration” by asking general 
knowledge and stock market forecasts questions. Participants are asked to provide confidence 
intervals when answering questions. The “better than average effect” is measured by asking 
questions concerning skills and performance relative to others. An example of such a question 
is “What % of customers of your discount brokerage house have better skills than you at 
identifying stocks with above average performance in the future?” Results show  that 
individual investors who think they are above average in terms of investment skills or past 
performance trade more. However, surprisingly, measures of miscalibration are unrelated to 
measures of trading volume. This conclusion is particularly striking because researchers 
incorporating overconfidence typically rely on the miscalibration literature to motivate this 
assumption. 
However, even if the presence of overconfidence has been studied in a number of 
countries, no such research has yet been carried out in France.  Furthermore, the only 
European empirical research dealing with the  subject on individual data concerns 3 079 
accounts (Glaser and Weber, 2007). Our paper fits this loophole by investigating the trading 
records of 43 958 individual investors at a French discount brokerage house between 1999 
and 2006 and thus is the most comprehensive in the European context. The paper is organized 
as follows. Section II  describes the data and introduces the methodology.   Section III  is 










II – Data and methodology 
 
The main data is provided by a large French discount brokerage house. We obtain 
transaction records for all active
3
In order to test for overconfidence, we extract a dataset containing only trades on 
European common stocks.  This dataset includes 4 714 702 trades, with 2 482 190 buy orders 
and 2 232 512 sell orders made by 43 958 investors over 2 031 assets. For each stock we build 
a file containing historical daily prices over the period 1999-2006. In this respect, securities’ 
ISIN codes are used to collect price data and information on splits and dividends through SIX-
Telekurs -Fininfo
 accounts over the period 1999-2006, that is 9 619 898 trades 
with 5 074 732 buy orders and 4 545 166 sell orders for 92 603 individual investors. The data 
is contained in three files: trades, investors and fees. The trades files combines the following 
data for each trade : ISIN code of the asset, type of asset (common stocks, certificates, 
warrants), buy-sell indicator, short sale indicator, quantity and amount in Euros, account type 
(traditional versus tax-free account or French Plan d’Epargne en Actions (PEA)) and the 
media used to place the order. The investors file gathers demographical information about the 
investors: date of birth, sex, place of living, among others. The fees file contains monthly fees 
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The typical investor is a man (78.28 %), 47.9 years old on average. Table 1 describes 
some preliminary statistics. The average number of assets per trade is 495. Over the whole 
dataset period, investors realize 107 trades on average amounting to 3 945 € per trade (3 784 € 
for buy orders and 4 106 € for sell orders). Most of the trades relate to French stocks (94%), 
followed by trades of stocks from the Netherlands (4,1%) and from Luxembourg (0.7%). 
Over 1999-2006, the most commonly traded French, Dutch and Luxembourgish securities are 
respectively Alcatel-Lucent, Stmicroelectronics and Arcelor-Mital.  Finally, on average 
investors are active 4.83 years over 8.  
 
Table 1 about here  
 
To test for overconfidence, we use the methodology proposed by Odean (1999). Over 
defined horizons, the stocks bought by investors should outperform those they sell by at least 
enough to pay the  costs of trading. On the other hand, overconfident traders may  hold 
mistaken beliefs about potential gains and buy and sell stocks even if these trades do not 
cover transaction costs. Investors  may  express  overconfidence  in two different manners. 
Following Odean (1999), either they overestimate the precision of private information or/and 
they have biased interpretation of publicly available information. If traders are informed but 
overestimate the accuracy of this information, they are not likely to face losses beyond the 
loss of transaction costs. On the opposite, if instead (or in addition) to being overconfident in 
the precision of information, investors overestimate their ability to interpret information; they 
may incur average losses beyond transaction costs.  
In order to test for overconfidence, we decide to test if investors overestimate their ability to 
interpret information and determine whether the securities bought by the investors in the 8 
 
dataset outperform those they sell when trading costs are ignored.  Note that the average 
trading costs paid by the investors, excluding the bid-ask spread is about 0.25%.   
We look at return horizons of 3 months, 6 months and 1 year. To calculate the average returns 
to securities bought (sold) by the investors over the T (T = 3 months, 6 months and 1 year) 
trading period subsequent to the purchase, we index each purchase (sale) transaction with a 
subscript i, i= 1,…,N. Each transaction is composed of a security ji and a date ti. If the same 
stock is bought (sold) in different accounts on the same day, each purchase (sale) is counted 
as a distinct observation. The average return to the securities bought and sold over the T 















= +− ∑∏    (1) 
where Rj,t is the daily return for security j on date t. We compare the average returns on 
securities bought and sold to the average amount of trading costs paid by investors.  
 
We test whether over the same horizons, the average returns to securities bought are less than 
the average returns to securities sold, ignoring transaction costs. More formally, we test : 
 
H0: Average returns to securities bought ≥ Average returns to securities sold 
This  assumption  compares the average return  to stocks bought and sold over subsequent 
periods. Returns are averaged over trading histories of investors and across investors.  Many 
securities are bought or sold on more than one date and may even be bought or sold by the 
same investors on the same day.  Suppose for example an investor sells a stock at a given date 
t and that 2 months later, another investor sells the same stock. Returns on this stock over a 3 
month period are not independent because the periods overlap for 2 months. Thus, any 9 
 
statistical test which requires independence of observations cannot be employed. Statistical 
significance is thus estimated by conducting a Wilcoxon signed rank test of differences. We 
look at each investor in the dataset separately and determine for each of the chosen horizons 
(T=3 months, 6 months, 1 year) the average returns earned by the investor on the stocks 
bought and sold. We thereby construct distributions of average returns on securities bought 
and sold. The Wilcoxon test allows to compare the different distributions. Note that this test 
uses both the information on the direction and the relative magnitude of the differences of 
returns earned by the same investor on the stocks he purchases and stocks he sells. The null 
hypothesis is the following:  
H’0: X and Y are samples from populations with the same medians and the same continuous 
distributions. 
 
This first methodology allows the computation of equally-weighted average returns. In 
order to complete our results and compare the average returns on portfolios bought and sold, 
we additionally measure the weighted average returns on securities bought and sold. More 
precisely, we basically follow the same steps as the ones involved in the  methodology 
described before except that at the end, we report weighted average returns. These returns on 
portfolio bought (sold) are computed in the following manner. Looking at the total amount of 
euros spent by investors on securities bought (sold) over the period 1999-2006, we value the 
weight of each buy (sell) transaction. The weight of the buy transaction j is: 
Total amount of euros spent by investors on transaction j
Pj Total amount of euros spent by investors on buy orders =
              
                
The weighted average returns to securities bought (sold) then refers to the sum of the returns 
earned on each transaction  j multiplied by the appropriate weights Pj. As before, we test : 10 
 
 
H’’0: Average weighted returns to securities bought ≥ Average weighted returns to securities sold 
We estimate statistical significance by conducting a Wilcoxon sign rank test of difference. 
Finally, to check the robustness of our results, we also gauge the profitability of 
purchases and sales by using a calendar time method. We construct calendar-time portfolios 
consisting of all purchase (sale) events during a “portfolio formation period” (3 months and 6 
months). To be more precise, each time a purchase (sale) occurs during the formation period, 
we assign this security to the calendar-time portfolio. The same security may have been 
bought or sold several times during the “portfolio formation period”. If this is the case, each 
purchase is counted as a separate observation. Each position is weighed equally. Finally, we 
calculate the “Buy” (“Sell”) portfolio return  for the calendar month subsequent to the 
formation period. Rolling forward the formation period by one month, a time-series of 
calendar-time portfolio returns for month t+1 is obtained. 
Based on the calendar-time approach, we calculate two measures of performance. The 
first one is simply the average monthly calendar time return on the “Buy” portfolio minus the 
“Sell” Portfolio. We test whether the average return on the “Buy” portfolio is less than the one 
to the “Sell” portfolio. The second performance measure is Jensen’s alpha (Jensen, 1969). We 
perform the following regression: 
,, ,, , () st p p pt Bt Mt ft RR R R αβ ε −= + − +                    (2) 
 
where  
, Bt R  is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio based on purchases 
, St R is the monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio based on sales 11 
 
, Mt R  is the monthly return on a market index, the DJ EURO STOXX 50 
, ft R  is the monthly returns on BTAN  
p β  is the  market beta and 
, pt ε  the regression error term. 
 
III  Results   
 
(i)  Average returns to securities bought and sold 
 
Table 2 report the principal results. Panel A presents the average returns to securities 
bought and sold for the three follow-up periods we consider (T= 3 months, 6 months, 1 year). 
Panel B gives results for the Wilcoxon test.  
 The results in Panel A show that for all three horizons we study the average returns to 
securities bought are lower than to securities sold.  For example, for the whole sample, over a 
6 month period, the average return to a purchased security is 3.105 % lower than to a security 
sold. These results are particularly striking: stocks investors are buying are underperforming 
stocks they are selling even before taking into account transaction costs. In other words, 
investors are clearly not making profitable trades:  they not only are paying transaction costs 
to trade but they are also making poor portfolio choices.  Overconfidence in the ability to 
interpret information may be a good explanation for these findings. 
Panel B gives indications about the statistical significance of our results. We denote 
(A) [resp. (B)] the distribution of average returns earned by each individual investor on 
purchased (resp. sold) stocks over a 3 month period subsequent to the purchase (sale). (C) 
[resp. (D)] is the distribution of average returns on bought (resp. sold) securities over a 6 
month period. Finally, (E) [resp. (F)] refers to the distribution of average returns on purchased 12 
 
(resp. sold) stocks over a 1 year horizon. V is the number of ranks of positive differences. As 
N = 43 958 is a large sample size, the number of the ranks of positive differences, V, is 
approximately normal. Results show that the distributions of average returns to bought and 
sold securities are significantly different, whichever period considered (T= 3 months, 6 
months, 1 year), H’0 is rejected at all three horizons at a 1% level. 
 
 
(ii) Weighted average returns to securities bought and sold 
 
Table 3 presents the results obtained for weighted average returns.  Panel A reports the 
average weighted returns to securities bought and sold for the three follow-up periods  
(T= 3 months, 6 months, 1 year). Panel B gives results for the Wilcoxon test.  
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 




The results bring further evidence of overconfidence in the trading behavior of our individual 
investors. Panel A show that for all three horizons we study (T= 3 months, 6 months, 1 year), 
the average weighted returns to securities bought are again lower than to securities sold.  For 
example, for the whole sample, over a 6 month period, the average return to a purchased 13 
 
security is 1.926% lower than to a security sold. Investors are making poor portfolio 
decisions. 
Statistical significance is estimated in Panel B.. We denote (A) [resp. (B)] the distribution of 
average weighted returns earned by each individual investor on purchased (resp. sold) stocks 
over a 3 month period subsequent to the purchase (sale). (C) [resp. (D)] is the distribution of 
average weighted returns on bought (resp. sold) securities over a 6 month period. Finally, (E) 
[resp. (F)] refers to the distribution of average weighted  returns on purchased (resp. sold) 
stocks over a 1 year horizon. V is the number of ranks of positive differences. As N = 43 958 
is a large sample size, the number of the ranks of positive differences, V, is approximately 
normal. Results show that the distributions of average  weighted  returns to bought and sold 
securities are significantly different, whichever period considered (T= 3 months, 6 months, 1 
year). 
(iii)  Calendar time portfolios 
 
Table 4 reports the results. Panel A presents the average monthly calendar time return 
on the “Buy” portfolio, on the “Sell” Portfolio as well as the difference between the returns. 
Panel B gives the estimates of Jensen’s alpha. t-values are given in parentheses. 
The results confirm the ones obtained in  the first part of this section. The values 
reported in Panel A show that for the two portfolio formation periods, the monthly returns to 
the “Bu /Sell” portfolio are significantly negative. For instance, if we consider a portfolio 
formation period of 6 months, the “Sell” portfolio outperforms the “Buy” portfolio on average 
by 0.2%. Investors in the dataset are clearly making poor portfolio choices ; they are trading 
too much. 14 
 
Results from Panel B confirm these conclusions. The Jensen’s α estimates are all significantly 
negative. The portfolios held by our investors are underperforming the market, once more 







In this paper, we investigate the presence of overconfidence for 43 958 individual investors 
using a large brokerage account database between 1999 and 2006.  Based on three 
methodologies, our main results show that individual investors are subject to overconfidence 
and consequently trading too frequently. More precisely, securities or portfolios investors are 
buying are systematically underperforming those they are selling on follow-up periods. This 
study confirms that investors are clearly not making profitable trades. 
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Tableau 1 Descriptive statistics  
This table contains results based on 4 714 702 trades (2 482 190 buy orders and 2 232 512 sell orders) 
for 43 958 investors over 1999-2006. “Age” (in years) is computed on 01/01/2006, “Activity over 
1999-2006” is valued for active accounts. “Trade amount / investor” [resp.  Total Nb of 





Variable  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 
25%  50%  75%  99% 
Age  47.90  13.67  37  46  57  83 
Nb. Assets/trade  495.50  5284    24  60  200  7700 
Trade amount/trade (€)             
Buy  3784.51  9850  1199.78    2013.01    4642.86    24299.19    
Sell  4106.44  10757     1241.43  2276.09  5243.12  27290.40 
Total Nb. Of trades /investor  107  392  21  43  99  994 
Activity over 1999-2006  4.83  2.03  3  5  7  8 17 
 
 
Table 2 Average returns and statistical significance 
This table contains results based on 4 714 702 trades. Panel A reports average returns (%) to 
securities bought and sold for 3 follow-up periods: 3 months, 6 months and 1 year. “N” refers to the 
number of observations and ”Difference” reports the difference between the average returns to 
securities bought and sold over each horizon. Panel B gives indications about statistical significance 
of the results reported in Panel A. (A)([resp. (B)] refers to the distribution of average returns earned 
by each individual investor on purchased (resp. sold) stocks over a 3 month period subsequent to the 
purchase (sale). (C) [resp. (D)] is the distribution of average returns on bought (resp. sold) securities 
over a 6 month period. (E) [resp. (F)] refers to the distribution of average returns on purchased (resp. 






Panel A : Average returns following purchases and sales (%) 
  N  3 months later  6 months later  1 year later 
Purchases  2 482 190  2.085  2.249  2.569 
Sales  2 232 512  4.434  5.354  6.697 
Difference    -2.349  -3.105  -4.128 
Panel B : Wilcoxon Tests 
  A/B  C/D  E/F 
V  239 357 494  242 735 973  233 872 295 
E(V)  482 999 517.5  482 845 689  478 067 292.5 
Variance (V)  707 6667 430 651.25  7073 286 972 442.5  6968 547 889 126.12 
p-Value 
(Bilateral) 
< 0.0001***  < 0.0001***  < 0.0001*** 
Alpha  0.05  0.05  0.05 18 
 
Table 3  Weighted average returns and statistical significance 
This table contains results based on 4 714 702 trades. Panel A reports average weighted returns (%) 
to securities bought and sold for 3 follow-up periods: 3 months, 6 months and 1 year. “N” refers to 
the number of observations and ”Difference” reports the difference between the average weighted 
returns to securities bought and sold over each horizon. Panel B gives indications about statistical 
significance of the results reported in Panel A. (A)([resp. (B)] refers to the distribution of average 
weighted returns earned by each individual investor on purchased (resp. sold) stocks over a 3 month 
period subsequent to the purchase (sale). (C) [resp. (D)] is the distribution of average weighted 
returns on bought (resp. sold) securities over a 6 month period. (E) [resp. (F)] refers to the 
distribution of average weighted returns on purchased (resp. sold) stocks over a 1 year horizon. V is 
the number of ranks of positive differences. 
 
 
Panel A : Average weighted returns following purchases and sales (%) 
  N  3 months later  6 months later  1 year later 
Purchases  2 482 190  0.6106  1.628  2.177 
Sales  2 232 512  2.171  3.554  4.638 
Difference    -1.555  -1.926  -2.462 
Panel B : Wilcoxon Tests 
  A/B  C/D  E/F 
V  466 750 742,5  452 521 632,5  525 668 467,5 
E(V)  482 999 517,5  482 845 688,5  478 067 292,5 
Variance (V)  7076 667 430 553,37  7073 286 972 351,62  6968 547 889 042,37 
p-Value 
(Bilateral) 
< 0,0001***  < 0,0001***  < 0,0001*** 
Alpha  0,05  0,05  0,05 19 
 
Table 4 Calendar time portfolios 
This table contains results based on 4 714 702 trades. Calendar-time portfolios consisting of all 
purchase (sale) events during a “portfolio formation period” (3 months and 6 months) are constructed 
and two measures of performance are computed. Panel A reports the average calendar time return on 
the “Buy” and “Sell” portfolio. “Difference” is the difference between the average returns on the two 
portfolios. Panel B gives of Jensen’s alpha. t-values are given in parentheses. 
 
Panel A : Returns on “Buy” and “Sell” Portfolios 
  Portfolio formation period 
  3 months  6 months 
“Buy” portfolio  -0.010  -0.009 
“Sell” portfolio  -0.007  -0.008 
Difference  -0.003**  -0.002* 
  (-2.17)  (-1.553) 
Panel B: Jensen’s alpha 
  Portfolio formation period 
  3 months  6 months 
Jensen’s α  -0.260**  -0.135* 
  (-2.496)  (-1.68) 
β  0.118***  0.092*** 
  (7.56)  (7.67) 
***, **,* - Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 i 
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